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CAPPING AUDITOR LIABILITY:
UNSUITABLE FISCAL POLICY IN OUR
CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
INTRODUCTION
Solving the current global financial crisis will require increased
investment in the capital markets coupled with appropriate government
intervention.1 In order to ensure that investors will provide the impetus
necessary to revive our economy, it is of the utmost importance that
investors are confident in our domestic capital markets.2 As one
commentator has noted “[i]t may be the [confident] investor who has
[created] a multi-trillion dollar public securities market in which
corporations . . . annually raise hundreds of billions of dollars of new
capital . . . . But there is good reason to suspect that trusting investors may
be the heart and soul of the modern market.”3
In the first quarter of 2009, the household sector, consisting of
individual investors, held over 36.9% of corporate equities in the United
States.4 From 2007 through the third quarter of 2009, investment in
corporate equities by the household sector alone, dropped from a high of
917 trillion dollars to a four year low of 518 trillion dollars.5 This drastic
drop in individual investment correlates to severe decreases in investor
confidence.6 Individual investors play an irrefutable role in the economy,
and they currently possess billions of dollars in liquidity that they are
1. Gregory W. Brown & Christian Lundblad, The U.S. Economic Crisis: Root Causes and the
ACCOUNTANCY,
Oct.
2009,
available
at
Road
to
Recovery,
J.
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2009/Oct/20091781.htm?action=print (arguing that
any solution to the economic crisis must begin with both, higher levels of real and financial
investment, and smart national economic policies, such as capitalizing on exports and increased
government spending).
2. Posting
of
Tom
Davenport
to
Harvard
Business
Review
Blogs,
http://discussionleader.hbsp.com/davenport/2008/10/we_need_to_renovate_the_old_ec.html (Oct.
21, 2008, 18:56 EST); see also Ken Little, Stock Market Often Leads Economy in Rebound,
ABOUT.COM, http://stocks.about.com/od/investing101/a/020909stocks.htm (arguing that in order
for the stock market to lead the economy out of the financial crisis “investors must once again feel
confident about the economy and the stock market”).
3. Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game 35 (UCLA Sch. of Law Research Paper
Series, Research Paper No. 02-18, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=322301.
4. FED. RESERVE SYS., BD. OF GOVERNORS, FEDERAL RESERVE STATISTICAL RELEASE:
FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES 90, tbl. L.213 (Dec. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/. To compute the numbers above, the
percentage of corporate equities held by the household sector was reached by dividing the dollar
amount, in billions, of corporate equities held by the household sector, by the total holdings of
corporate equities at market value. See id. It is important to note that the household sector does not
include individual investors who invest through mutual funds, which accounts for another $3304.9
billion invested in corporate equities. Id. at 90.
5. Id. at 90.
6. Dave Valiante, Investors’ Confidence in U.S. Capital Markets Drops, WALL ST. & TECH.,
Aug. 15, 2008, http://www.wallstreetandtech.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=210002944.
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reluctant to invest.7 It is this very liquidity that could revive our capital
markets, thereby necessitating a policy that mends and increases investor
confidence, allowing investors to reinvest in the markets as they once did.
One important way that investor confidence is developed and
maintained is through the rigorous external audits that corporations
undergo.8 Audit reports are vital in order to make investors aware of the
financial health of a corporation, and bestow upon them the ability to make
informed decisions on whether a particular investment is suitable.9 In our
current financial state, the role of the auditor is paramount, and the laws that
regulate the role of auditors are more crucial than ever in order to increase
investor confidence.10
Like most aspects of the capital markets, statutory law heavily
influences the role of auditors.11 Statutory law governs much of what
auditors are required to investigate and disclose to potential investors, as
well as the steps they are required to take to ensure accuracy.12 However,
the threat of litigation serves as another strong force to ensure accuracy in
external audits.13 Because the costs of potential litigation are so excessive,
auditors are forced to ensure that the reports they issue to the investing
public are thorough and precise.14 If the United States and major capital
markets abroad were to cap the liabilities that auditors face, a major
incentive to do thorough, accurate work would be lifted.15 Such a
disincentive would result in a decrease in investor confidence, which in turn
could have a devastating effect on the global capital markets as investors

7. See Roy Furchgott, You’ve Sold Your Stock. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2009, at
SPG4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/your-money/asset-allocation/26stash.
html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=investors%20sidelines%202008&st=cse; see also Ron Lieber, Switching
to Cash May Feel Safe, but Risks Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/yourmoney/09money.html?scp=17&sq=investors%
20sidelines%202008&st=cse.
8. See Sarah Johnson, The Cost of Auditor Independence, CFO.COM, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/13111528.
9. See generally Marianne Ojo, The Role of External Auditors and International Accounting
Bodies in Financial Regulation and Supervision (Mar. 2006), available at http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/354/.
10. John P. Coffey, Trouble with a Cap on Liability: Protecting Auditors Weakens Corporate
Accountability, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 12, 2008, http://www.pionline.com/apps/
pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080512/PRINTSUB/206375828/1026/TOC.
11. See Jeffrey W. Gunther & Robert R. Moore, Auditing the Auditors: Oversight or Overkill?,
ECON. & FIN. POL’Y REV., 2002, at 1, 10, 14, available at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/
efpr/pdfs/v01_n05_a01.pdf (discussing federal legislation of auditors).
12. Id. at 14.
13. See id. at 15.
14. Id.
15. CEA, CEA Response to the EC Consultation on Auditors’ Liability and Its Impact on the
European Capital Markets, Annex 1 to RC7022 (03/07) (Mar. 15, 2007), www.cea.eu/
uploads/DocumentsLibrary/documents/position324.pdf.
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began to invest less money.16 “Investors invest not because they trust
managers, brokers, and investment advisors, but because they rely on the
legal system to discourage managers, brokers, and investment advisors from
behaving like the scoundrels they are.”17 Auditor liability is an integral part
of the legal system these investors rely on. Despite these potentially severe
side effects, there is a movement in the United States to cap the liabilities
which auditors face.18 Since early 2008, there has been a concerted effort
among domestic auditors to push the Treasury Department to provide
public policy recommendations in favor of capping auditors’ liabilities.19
In light of the fact that there is a serious movement to cap liability,20 it
is necessary to investigate the devastating effects that these policies will
have on the U.S. capital markets vis-à-vis investor confidence. Capping
auditor liability, which will decrease investor confidence at a time when the
domestic and global capital markets are so fragile and in desperate need of
the economic boost that continued financial investment could provide, is an
uncalled for and inappropriate policy in our current financial climate.
Part I of this note discusses the role of auditors in our capital markets
and the effects that audit reports have on individual investors. Part II
discusses the history of auditor regulation and legislation, the current
regulatory state, and the role that crisis has played in revolutionizing the
importance of the auditor in our capital markets. Part III examines the
liabilities which auditors face in the current legislative and regulatory
climate and the reasons why auditors are calling for liability reform. Part IV
discusses the various proposals for reforming auditor liability being
considered and the reasons why these various plans will be detrimental to
our markets. Finally, Part V examines the potential effects of capping
auditor liability in light of our incredibly fragile economic situation.
I. THE ROLE OF THE AUDITOR IN INVESTMENT & CAPITAL
MARKETS
The auditor is an integral component of our financial capital markets,
and it is necessary to understand the purposes the auditor serves before

16. Directorate General for Internal Market and Services, Summary Report: Consultation on
Auditor’s Liability: Summary Report, at 14 (2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/summary_report_en.pdf [hereinafter Directorate General,
Summary Report].
17. Stout, supra note 3, at 293. “The possibility that many investors invest because they ‘trust
the market’ . . . offers to explain a number of otherwise-puzzling market anomalies that are
difficult if not impossible to reconcile with the rational expectations model [of investors].” Id. at
31.
18. Tammy Whitehouse, Audit Firms Push (Again) for Liability Caps, COMPLIANCE WK., July
8, 2008, available at http://www.complianceweek.com/article/4243/audit-firms-push-again-forliability-caps.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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investigating why the liability reforms called for would be so detrimental.21
For over half a century, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has supported increased auditor responsibility and “gatekeeper” activity, as
a means of ensuring the stability of the financial markets and increasing
investor confidence, thereby providing for further investment in the capital
markets.22 The external audit report is an integral tool in the capital markets,
as it signals to investors that the information which management releases in
regards to the financial health of a corporation is reliable.23 The auditor
serves as an independent party that can verify the validity of the
corporation’s statements and bolster investors’ confidence when selecting
where to invest their money.24
The SEC believes that the key to promoting investor confidence lies in
auditor reports that are high quality, thorough, and inform the potential
investor of the risks involved in purchasing particular securities.25 The
external audit is the preferred mode of oversight because it purports to be
more thorough and accurate than the internal audit reports that the
corporation creates.26 If auditors do their job properly, fraud, misstatements,
and omissions should be avoided, and investors can be confident in relying
on financial statements as a guide to proper investment choices.27
Audit reports have very real and significant consequences on whether
investors are willing to purchase or retain shares of a corporation.28
Statements by the auditor that even appear to question the fate of a
corporation are enough to make current shareholders sell their interests and
impede future investment in the corporation.29
The continued reliability of the external audit report is crucial to
improving investor confidence in our capital markets, which is increasingly

21. See generally Gunther & Moore, supra note 11.
22. SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last
visited Apr. 12, 2010).
23. See generally Ojo, supra note 9.
24. Id. at 2.
25. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES MARKETS: OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO
ENHANCE INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND IMPROVE LISTING PROGRAM OVERSIGHT 102 (2004).
26. Johnson, supra note 8. The external audit is seen as a necessary line of defense because
internal auditors are employed by the company and there are potential conflicts of interest inherent
in this position. Id. Often internal auditors report to the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and it is
within the CFO’s department that financial misstatements can occur. Id. It might be in the best
interest of the internal auditor not to report certain misstatements, if it would ensure further job
security. Id.
27. James H. Irving et al., An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Liability Caps on the
Auditing Market 8 (Feb. 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1490056.
28. James Dornbrook, Highlighting Risk: Audit Reports that Question a Company’s Ability to
Continue as a Going Concern Can Light a Fire Under Investors, KAN. CITY BUS. J., May 16,
2008, available at http://kansascity.bizjournals.com/kansascity/stories/2008/05/19/focus19.html.
29. Id.
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important as of late.30 With the recent financial crisis in the American
market, it has become necessary to find new sources of capital to pump
back into our failing system.31 “It’s really about how confidence evolves
. . . . Yes, fundamentals are bad, but if investors don’t have confidence to
lend money to the real economy, then the real economy won’t be able to
progress.”32 One of the best ways to promote this investor confidence and
encourage investors to put much needed funds back into our capital markets
is to ensure that the information they are receiving is valid and informed.33
The Center for Audit Quality recommends that “[t]o improve their
confidence in the U.S. capital markets . . . investors support the creation of
an institute to enable auditing firms to share experiences and develop best
practices for fraud prevention and detection.”34 There is also a push for
rules that require further public disclosure, as well as forms that are easier
for the average investor to read and comprehend, in order to allow more
informed investment decisions.35 All of these efforts would further the goal
of increasing transparency of corporate financials and promote further
investment and involvement in the capital markets.36
As the economy is now in a recession, the necessary revival of the
capital markets will be facilitated by increased investor confidence as a
means of ensuring continued financial investment.37 Investor confidence has
clearly been affected by the current financial crisis.38 “[F]or investors, the
level of pessimism and fear is so obvious it hardly needs to be measured,
but it is confirmed by the data.”39 In the midst of the most recent financial
crisis, a poll “of its members by the American Association of Individual
Investors . . . . [showed] bearishness ha[d] risen to 56.7% bearish, and
bullishness had dropped to only 21.7% . . . . ”40 The same poll, a week later
showed “55.1% [of members] were bearish, [and] only 24.3% [were]
bullish.”41 In addition, “the Fear Index [VIX Index] . . . show[ed] a

30. Mary Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Speech at the SIFMA Annual Conference: The Road to
Investor Confidence (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch
102709mls.htm.
31. Valiante, supra note 6.
32. Jeremy Gaunt, Markets’ Success in September Depends on Investors’ Confidence, INT’L
HERALD TR., Aug. 31, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=15762397.
33. See generally Valiante, supra note 6.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See generally id.
37. Schapiro, supra note 30.
38. Valiante, supra note 6.
39. Sy Harding, Consumer and Investor Sentiment!, FIN. SENSE, Feb. 27, 2009,
http://www.financialsense.com/fsu/editorials/harding/2009/0227.html.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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considerably higher level of investor fear than at the bottom of any of the
legs down in the 2000–2002 bear market.”42
State Street Global Markets, an investment-trading branch of a publicly
traded corporation, also creates an Investor Confidence Index to measure
investor confidence in the capital markets.43
The State Street Investor Confidence Index measures investor confidence
on a quantitative basis by analyzing the actual buying and selling patterns
of institutional investors. The index is based on a financial theory that
assigns precise meaning to changes in investor risk appetite, or the
willingness of investors to allocate their portfolios to equities. The more of
their portfolio that institutional investors are willing to devote to equities,
the greater their risk appetite or confidence [in the capital markets].44

In 2007, investor confidence of North American investors in the capital
markets ranged between 89.3 and 118.9.45 This is high in light of the fact
that average scores during healthy economic times are normally between
100 and 110.46 In late 2007 through 2008, the investor confidence index
began to show a dramatic decline.47 This dramatic decline in investor
confidence correlates to the beginning of the current financial crisis.48 In
October 2008 alone, the index of North American investors declined 25.1
points to an all time low of 50.8.49 This was an “unprecedented decline in
investor confidence to a new record low, led by investors in North
America.”50

42. Id. “[T]he poll of its members by the American Association of Individual Investors is
considered to be at extreme pessimism whenever the poll shows bearishness has risen to more
than 55%, and bullishness has dropped below 25%.” Id.
43. See generally STATE STREET, INVESTOR CONFIDENCE INDEX SUMMARY (2008).
The State Street Investor Confidence Index® measures the attitude of investors to risk.
The Index uses the principles of modern financial theory to model the underlying
behavior of global investors. The Index provides a quantitative measure of the actual
and changing levels of risk contained in investment portfolios representing about 15%
of the world’s tradable assets.
Id. at 5.
44. Press Release, State Street, Investor Confidence Index Declines from 75.7 to 58.2 in
October (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://pr.statestreet.com/us/en/20081021_1.html [hereinafter
Press Release, State Street].
45. STATE STREET, INVESTOR CONFIDENCE INDEX HISTORICAL DATA 1,
http://www.statestreet.com/industry_insights/investor_confidence_index/ici_overview.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2010).
46. See id. (when the economy was relatively healthy in 2003–2005 averages tended to range
between these numbers).
47. Id.
48. See Krassimir Petrov, Current Economic Crisis Worse than the Great Depression,
MARKET ORACLE, Nov. 2, 2008, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article7099.html (discussing the
beginning of the current financial crisis).
49. Press Release, State Street, supra note 44.
50. Id.
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Capping the liability of auditors at a time when accurate reports are
necessary could worsen this precipitous drop in investor confidence and
have further devastating effects. This decrease in investor confidence was
likely caused by the domestic financial crisis, followed by the spread of
these effects globally.51 It is the fear that domestic and international capital
markets have entered into a recession that has, and will continue to,
decrease investor confidence a great deal.52 The United States’ position as a
leader of the global economy could be at stake if the capital markets are not
revived with new investments.53 Foreign leaders have questioned whether
the U.S. dollar should remain in the prominent position it currently holds in
the global economy.54 While this is mere speculation, it is worth noting that
fast resolution and revival of our capital markets through increased investor
confidence and investment could very well be the best way to ensure our
position as a global economic leader.55
II. THE EVOLUTION OF AUDITOR REGULATION AND
LEGISLATION & THE CURRENT REGULATORY REGIME
An earlier financial crisis, the Great Depression, sheds light upon the
origins of the role of the external auditor.56 Following World War I, the
economy of the United States was strong and many individuals began to
invest their money in publicly traded companies.57 During this surge of
investment activity, there was little federal regulation of the securities
markets.58 While many proposals that called for the federal government to
oversee the sale of stocks and to regulate financial disclosure were made, it
was rare that they were ever taken seriously.59 The major focus of both the
government and business at the time was on turning a profit.60
Early investment in the stock market was very speculative in nature and
had many systemic problems because corporations wanted capital without
51. Id.
52. See Prieur du Plessis, Fear Grips Stock Markets as Economies Tip into Recession,
MARKET ORACLE, Oct. 5, 2008, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article6631.html.
53. Thomas Omestad, Does Financial Crisis Threaten America’s Central Role in Global
Economy?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 10, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/
2008/10/10/does-financial-crisis-threaten-americas-central-role-in-global-economy.html; Brown
& Lundblad, supra note 1.
54. See Mark Deen & Isabelle Mas, India Joins Russia, China in Questioning U.S. Dollar
Prominence, BLOOMBERG, July 4, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601087&sid=aR7yfqUwTb4M#.
55. See Omestad, supra note 53.
56. See William R. Pape and Robert Sadler, Adding Traceability Review to the External Audit
(Packing and Food Safety), ENTREPRENEUR.COM, Sept. 2008, http://www.entrepreneur.com/
tradejournals/article/print/186284581.html.
57. See Harold Bierman, Jr., The 1929 Stock Market Crash, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA (2008),
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/Bierman.Crash.
58. SEC, supra note 22.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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regulation and eager investors were willing to invest their money regardless
of whether the market was properly regulated.61 Corporations artificially
inflated stock prices to make them appear more desirable and lenders
artificially inflated interest rates as well.62 There was also an increase of
purchasing stocks on margin, which facilitated the “final expansion and
crash of the stock market.”63 Common sentiment at the time was that
eagerness and optimism had created an “‘exaggerated balloon of American
stock values.’”64 Many media outlets, as well as government officials,
began to see that the stock was excessively inflated, and started to make
public statements which ignited fears that the stock was in fact
overvalued.65 These statements led to a panic and investors began to sell
their stock rapidly,66 eventually causing the 1929 stock market crash and the
Great Depression that followed.67
The Great Depression wreaked havoc on the American economy and
necessitated a national solution to revive the capital markets. With over 25
billion dollars of worthless stock in their possession in the beginning of the
1930s,68 it is no surprise that investor distrust of the market was rampant.
Many Americans, individual investors, banks, and corporations feared for
the future of the nation’s financial state.69 The idea of federal regulation of
the booming securities market was never popular, but the national scope of
this crisis required a national solution.70 Solving the financial crisis fell on
the shoulders of Congress, the national body best suited to perform the
research necessary to fashion a solution.71
In light of the Great Depression, Congress immediately began holding
hearings with the intention of determining the quickest and most effective
solution to restore the financial markets.72 “There was a consensus that for
the economy to recover, the public’s faith in the capital markets needed to
61. Id.; see also Bierman, supra note 57; Steven Ramirez, Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
ENOTES.COM, http://www.enotes.com/major-acts-congress/securities-exchange-act.
62. Bierman, supra note 57.
63. See Gene Smiley & Richard H. Keehn, Margin Purchases, Brokers’ Loans and the Bull
Market of the Twenties, 2 BUS. & ECON. HISTORY 17, 129, 139 (1988) (noting that while the role
of buying on margin as a cause of the Great Depression may often be “overstated,” it is
undeniable that the ability to purchase stocks on margin facilitated the expansion and depth of the
consequences of the Great Depression).
64. Bierman, supra note 57, at 1–2 (quoting ECONOMIST 806 (Nov. 2, 1929)).
65. Id. at 6.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. SEC, supra note 22.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. This was a national depression with national consequences; thus, the goal of Congress
was to fashion a national response that would create uniform rules of fair dealing across the
country and protect investors nationally, as opposed to ad hoc measures taken by individual states
or exchanges. Id.
72. Id.
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be restored.”73 This would prove to be a daunting task, as it was at the
hands of these very markets that many Americans lost exorbitant portions
of their personal wealth.74
Within several years, Congress began to construct a legislative solution
to restore the economy. The national legislative effort to restore the capital
markets began with the Securities Act of 1933, followed with the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and culminated with the creation of the SEC.75 The
goal of the SEC was to “restore investor confidence in our capital markets
by providing investors and the markets with more reliable information and
clear rules of honest dealing.”76 This was accomplished through two major
initiatives. First, all companies that offered securities for public investment
would be required to make the public aware of their financial state, the
particular types of securities they are selling, and the risks that will be
involved with the particular investment.77 Second, all individuals involved
in the financial markets, including brokers, bankers, dealers, and the
exchanges themselves, were required to treat investors honestly and make
the individual investor their paramount concern.78
The primary way that the SEC attains these goals is through the free
flow of information transmitted to the public through various reporting
requirements that publicly traded corporations were required to complete.79
One way that the SEC ensures the accuracy of information that is disclosed
by a corporation is through mandatory external audits.80 Once companies
fulfill the various disclosures necessary to inform the shareholder of their
financial status, an external accountant must audit the forms.81 The
accountant is then required to attest to the validity of these statements upon
reasonable inspection of the company’s financial health.82 This is the origin
of the role of the auditor in American finance as a means of increasing
investor confidence in our capital markets.83
73. Id. at 3.
74. See The Stock Market Crash of 1929, MONEY ALERT, http://www.themoneyalert.com/
stockmarketcrashof1929.html (discussing the effects that the Great Depression had on consumers
and the fact that many Americans lost their entire life savings as a result of the Stock Market
Crash).
75. SEC, supra note 22.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See id.
79. Id.; see also Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006) (the Securities Act of 1933
created the various reporting requirements that publicly traded corporations are now required to
comply with).
80. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2006).
81. Lynn E. Turner, Chief Accountant, SEC, Speech sponsored by Washington University
School of Law and the Institute for Law and Economic Policy, Scottsdale, Arizona: Audit
Committees: A Roadmap for Establishing Accountability (Mar. 10, 2001), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch469.htm.
82. 15 U.S.C. § 77s.
83. See SEC, supra note 22.
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While it is beyond the scope of this note to discuss in detail, many
parallels exist between the post-Great Depression era and the financial
thinking that accompanied it, and the current economic climate that
America faces today.84 Distrust of capital markets is just as apparent now as
it was in the 1930s, and the method of getting out of this economic crisis,
beyond government intervention, is largely based on continued investment
and spending by individual investors as it was then.85 It is for this reason
that this note focuses on the need to revisit the same goal of increasing
investor confidence and the crucial role that the external auditor plays in
ensuring that corporations are honest with their potential investors that the
SEC expounded over seventy years ago. Without promoting continued
investor confidence through the role of the external auditor—and the
investments that will follow—it is possible that the effects of the current
financial crisis could be worse than the Great Depression.86
While the role of the auditor helped to increase investor confidence for
a period of time, within several decades, fraud and financial misstatements
became an issue once again.87 The Enron scandal is another crisis that
revolutionized the role of the external auditor.88 During the 1990s, there
were multiple instances of accounting fraud, most of which were on a
massive scale.89 “Some of these instances of frauds were undertaken in
conjunction with the external auditors of the companies involved.”90 This
massive corporate accounting fraud involved corporations such as Enron,
MCI, Inc., Tyco, Qwest, Adelphia Communications, and Global Crossing.91
Investors quickly lost confidence in the capital markets when such
orchestrated, large-scale frauds were revealed in many large corporations.92
While not all of these scandals directly involved auditors as the Enron
scandal did, many involved auditor oversight, at least tangentially.93
With the financial disclosure requirements developed by the SEC
beginning to fail investors once again, and distrust of the capital markets
84. James Quinn, America’s Economic Collapse: The Gathering Storm—Is Another Great
Depression Approaching?, CUTTING EDGE, Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.thecuttingedgenews.com/
index.php?article=826.
85. Id.
86. Petrov, supra note 48.
87. See Uma D. Sridharan et al., The Social Impact of Business Failure: Enron, 17 AM. J. BUS.
2, 12 (2002), available at http://www.bsu.edu/mcobwin/majb/?p=199.
88. See generally Gideon Mark, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the
PSLRA, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1097 (2007).
89. Id. at 1099.
90. Id. at 1099–1100.
91. Huck Gutman, Dishonesty, Greed and Hypocrisy in Corporate America,
http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0712-02.htm.
92. Id.
93. Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Arthur
Andersen Fires an Executive for Enron Orders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/enron-s-collapse-overview-arthur-andersen-firesexecutive-for-enron-orders.html?pagewanted=all.
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and big business growing exponentially, another national solution became
necessary to restore investor confidence and promote investment in our
capital markets.94 Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was enacted in
2002.95 “[SOX] put a necessary spotlight on corporate governance and
financial reporting.”96
In addition, SOX “called for the most significant reforms affecting our
capital markets since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”97 Indeed, SOX
dealt with the role of auditors as well as the general disclosure required by
corporations.98 SOX was the culmination of over thirty bills that Congress
enacted in order to revamp financial reporting, accounting, and retirement
accounts.99 Due to SOX, “[a]uditors must now face significant changes in
the regulatory landscape wrought by [SOX] as well as a charged
environment in which the SEC and others increasingly view independent
auditors as prime targets.”100
To these ends, SOX was created with four major goals: “[1] [T]o
improve corporate governance and ‘the tone at the top’ of a publicly
[traded] company . . . [2] to strengthen financial reporting and disclosure
. . . [3] to improve corporate internal controls and auditor performance [and]
. . . [4] to create a tougher enforcement environment for the [SEC] to
oversee.”101
One of these significant changes was the ability of the SEC to censure
an accountant serving as an external auditor who lacks character and
integrity, engages in unethical or improper conduct, or who willfully
violated, or assisted in the violation of, any securities provision.102 SOX
also altered the statute of limitations for securities fraud claims, making the
period within two years after the discovery of the fraud but no more than
five years after the actual fraud took place.103 SOX also made it a felony to
94. The Dramatic Change Across the Corporate Landscape to Re-Establish Investor
Confidence in the Integrity of Corporate Disclosures and Financial Reporting: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 178–79 (2003) [hereinafter
Hearings on Re-establishing Investor Confidence] (prepared statement of John J. Castellani,
President, The Business Roundtable) (discussing national legislative efforts to restore investor
confidence).
95. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, & 29 U.S.C.).
96. Hearings on Re-Establishing Investor Confidence, supra, note 94, at 154.
97. Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services,
109th Cong. 44 (2005) (testimony of William H. Donaldson, Chairman, SEC).
98. Edward P. Leibensperger & Lauren M. Papenhausen, Auditor Liability for Securities
Fraud After the PSLRA and Sarbanes-Oxley, in SECURITIES LITIGATION PLANNING AND
STRATEGIES—THE TIME IS NOW! 541, 543 (A. L. I.–A.B.A. Course of Study, May 8–9, 2002).
99. Id. at 543.
100. Id.
101. Thomas C. Pearson & Gideon Mark, Investigations, Inspections, and Audits in the PostSOX Environment, 86 NEB. L. REV. 43, 45–46 (2007).
102. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78d-3 (2006).
103. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2006).

334

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 4

destroy financial and auditing records, as well as failing to properly
maintain such records.104 Auditors are no longer allowed to offer other nonaudit related services to the corporations that they audit.105 Section 204 of
SOX also requires that the auditor report to the Audit Committee the
practices they use during their audits, suggestions they have made to
management of the corporation, and all of their communications with
management during the auditing period.106 Auditors must now attest to the
reports that they file as well as their assessment of the state of the
corporation, making themselves individually liable for the validity of the
reports.107 The extensive regulation that SOX has focused on auditors
illustrates the importance that the SEC places on the role of the external
auditor as a means of furthering the goal of increasing investor confidence.
Further regulating the important role of the external auditor, SOX
created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), which
falls under the oversight powers of the SEC.108 The PCAOB is a further
effort to ensure that fraud does not continue at the level of the external
auditor.109 It serves several functions, namely to:
(1) register public accounting firms that prepare audit reports for
issuers . . . ;
(2) establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing, quality control,
ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the preparation of
audit reports for issuers, in accordance with [§] 103;
(3) conduct inspections of registered public accounting firms, in
accordance with [§] 104 and the rules of the Board;
(4) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings concerning,
and impose appropriate sanctions where justified upon, registered public
accounting firms and associated persons of such firms . . . ;
(5) perform such other duties or functions as the Board (or the
Commission, by rule or order) determines are necessary or appropriate to
promote high professional standards among, and improve the quality of
audit services offered by, registered public accounting firms and
associated persons thereof, or otherwise to carry out this Act, in order to
protect investors, or to further the public interest;

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2006).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g) (2006).
Id. § 78j-1(k).
Id. § 7261.
Jaclyn Jaeger, Battle Continues Over PCAOB and SOX Future, COMPLIANCE WK., Dec.
15, 2009, http://www.complianceweek.com/article/5718/battle-continues-over-pcaob-and-soxfuture.
109. Sarah Q. Wirskye, Sarbanes-Oxley: The New Corporate Standards, PETROLEUM ACC. &
FIN. MGMT. J., Summer 2003, at 1.
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(6) enforce compliance with this Act, the rules of the Board,
professional standards and the securities laws relating to the preparation
and issuance of audit reports and the obligations and liabilities of
accountants with respect thereto, by registered public accounting firms and
associated persons thereof . . . .110

Taken as a whole, SOX clearly places more responsibility on auditors
who once were able to place the blame on a particular corporation.111 SOX
has made it painfully clear that government regulators believe that the
auditor’s role of gatekeeper is of the utmost importance and will no longer
be taken lightly.112
The impact of SOX has been “largely positive” and it has had a
significant impact on the confidence that investors have in the capital
markets.113 In 2004 alone, stock exchanges’ total market capitalizations
increase by 50%.114 This statistic shows an increase in investor confidence
in the market in the post-Enron period, and a willingness of individual
investors to put their money back into the capital markets.115 The post-SOX
era has seen an increase in conservative filings by corporations in an effort
to ensure that financial statements are as accurate as possible.116 There has
also been a decrease in the number of accounting restatements that are filed,
which most likely means that original statements that are being produced by
corporations are more accurate the first time around, one of the primary
goals of SOX.117
SOX is also credited with strengthening the integrity of the independent
audit and the value that external audit reports have.118 There has been vast
improvement in overall disclosure and financial reporting done by publicly
traded companies, with an effective system of control and enforcement to
ensure compliance with SOX and the SEC principles in general.119 Auditors
have stated that the industry has become more diligent and active, that the
110. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(c) (2006).
111. See Colin Linsley, Auditing, Risk Management and a Post Sarbanes-Oxley World
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002), ENTREPENEUR.COM, Fall 2003, http://www.entrepreneur.com/
tradejournals/article/print/111508706.html.
112. Id.
113. Sarbanes-Oxley at Four: Protecting Investors and Strengthening Markets: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 110th Cong. 56–61 (2006) (testimony of Christopher Cox,
Chairman, SEC).
114. Alyssa Machold Ellsworth, Managing Dir., Council of Institutional Investors, Federal
News Service, Remarks at U.S. News & World Reports National Issue Briefing: Corporate
America and Congress: Has Sarbanes-Oxley Increased Investor Confidence? (Oct. 5, 2005),
available at www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/corporate_governance/MediaMentions/
USNews_10.05.05.pdf.
115. See id.
116. Gerald J. Lobo & Jian Zhou, Did Conservatism in Financial Reporting Increase After the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act? Initial Evidence, 20 ACCT. HORIZONS 1, 18 (2006).
117. Id.
118. Leibensperger & Papenhausen, supra note 98, at 559.
119. Id.

336

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 4

expertise in the industry has largely improved with the personal liability
that SOX has required the auditors to take on,120 and that it has become
easier for them to successfully complete their tasks with the corporate
governance that is in place, as it is easier for them to get the information
necessary for their reports.121 There has also been increased cooperation
with the internal and external auditors that helps to promote the overall goal
of SOX: to increase the validity of statements regarding the financial state
of corporations.122
However, while SOX has been heralded as an effective piece of
legislation used to encourage auditors to take their role as gatekeepers
seriously, it has also been highly criticized.123 The first criticism that is
commonly offered is that excessive costs are necessary to comply with
SOX reporting requirements.124 There are a variety of external costs that
have developed, and because of the importance and necessity of external
auditors in the post-SOX era, auditors have raised their prices
dramatically.125 Specifically, in 2005, auditors raised prices by up to
58%.126 There have been many auditor dismissals in the post-SOX era,
largely because many corporations are not willing to pay these high costs.127
Some of the Big Four’s128 clients have attempted to replace their original
auditors with more affordable alternatives.129 Yet, overall, publicly traded
corporations have an undeniable preference for one of the Big Four, as a
result of their technical skills, reputation, and capacity.130
One of the most pertinent criticisms of SOX is the increased legal
liability that auditors now face as secondary actors in corporate fraud.131
120. Jeffrey Cohen et al., Corporate Governance in the Post Sarbanes-Oxley Era: Auditors
Experience, CONTEMP. ACCOUNT. RES. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5), available at
http:/papers./ssrn.com/abstract-1014029.
121. Id. (manuscript at 18).
122. Id.
123. Sarbanes-Oxley Act Improves Investor Confidence, But at a Cost, C.P.A. J., Oct. 2005,
http://www.nysscpa.org/printversions/cpaj/2005/.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See generally Michael L. Ettredge et al., Audit Fees and Auditor Dismissals in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Era, 21 ACCT. HORIZONS 4 (Dec. 2007).
128. The “big four” are the four largest accounting firms of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte
Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, and KPMG, “who audit nearly all the world’s biggest
companies . . . .” See Jennifer Hughes, EU Calls for Limits to Auditors Liability, FIN. TIMES, at 5,
June 7, 2008.
129. Ettredge et al., supra note 127.
130. General Accounting Office Reports & Testimony, Accounting Firm Consolidation:
Selected Large Public Company Views on Audit Fees, Quality, Independence and Choice,
ALLBUSINESS.COM, Sept. 30, 2003, http://www.allbusiness.com/public-administration/executivelegislative-other/669034-1.html; see also Talia Zubli, Solving the Problem of Unlimited Auditor
Liability, FIN. DIR., Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.the-financedirector.com/features/feature941/.
131. Kimberly Brame, Beyond Misrepresentations: Defining Primary and Secondary Liability
Under Subsections (A) and (C) of Rule 10-B-5, 67 LA. L. REV. 935, 935 (2007).
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Because auditors are legally required to verify that the reports they create
are accurate and truthful, they can now be held legally liable, both civilly
and criminally, for failure to honestly comply with this verification
requirement.132 Litigation has proliferated extensively in the post-SOX era.
“Soaring litigation, settlement costs, and insurance costs have reinforced the
need for greater quality in corporate governance, financial reporting,
external audits, and government enforcement of the securities law.”133 This
liability has provided major momentum towards auditor liability reform.134
It is important to remember, however, that when auditors comply with the
law, comply with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
proscribed by PCAOB, and do not involve themselves with fraud, potential
liability is minimal, if not nonexistent.135
III. AUDITOR LIABILITIES IN OUR CURRENT LEGISLATIVE
CLIMATE
Establishing the liability of external auditors who report on the financial
health of a company is one of the tools the SEC has employed to increase
investor confidence, but it has not come without costs.136 While it is true
that prior to SOX auditors faced legal liabilities, SOX has increased the
liabilities that auditors face, as they are now required to attest to the validity
of the statements provided by corporations.137 This liability is a means of
ensuring that auditors will be careful and accurate when reviewing financial
statements.138
The magnitude of the liabilities that auditors face is best evidenced by
particular lawsuits. “In the first quarter of [2008], PwC
[PricewaterhouseCoopers] settled three lawsuits[:] Metropolitan Mortgage
and SmarTalk Teleservices each for about $30 million, and Crocus venture
capital, for $6.1 million.”139 This is only a representative sample of the
liabilities that auditors have faced.140 In December of 1999, Ernst & Young
settled with the shareholders of Cendant for a total of $335 million.141 Ernst
132. Lisa McCauley-Parles et al., Sarbanes-Oxley: An Overview of Current Issues and
Concerns, ENTREPRENEUR.COM, Mar. 22, 2007, http://www.entrepreneur.com/tradejournals/
article/165359568.html.
133. Pearson & Mark, supra note 101, at 61.
134. See Leibensperger & Papenhausen, supra note 98, at 543.
135. See generally Marleen Willekens & Dan A. Simunic, Precision in Auditing Standards:
Effects on Auditor and Director Liability and the Supply and Demand for Audit Services, 37
ACCT. & BUS. RES. 3 (2007).
136. Sarbanes-Oxley Act Improves Investor Confidence, But at a Cost, supra note 123.
137. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006).
138. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act Improves Investor Confidence, But at a Cost, supra note 123.
139. Rick Telberg, Top 10 Auditor Liability Settlements, C.P.A. TRENDLINES, Apr. 15, 2008,
http://cpatrendlines.com/2008/04/15/top-10-auditor-liability-settlements/.
140. Id.
141. Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman L.L.P., Ernst & Young Agrees to $335 Million
Settlement with Cendant Shareholders, According to Plaintiffs’ Co-Counsel Bernstein Litowitz
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& Young was accused of failure to serve its function as watchdogs when
three annual reports, seven quarterly reports, and over twenty registration
statements were fraudulent.142 This purported failure to ensure that the
financial statements were properly made along with the reports’ fraudulent
statements of the corporation’s financial health is most likely what led to
the settlement.143
Another large settlement occurred in the litigation between the
shareholders of Rite-Aid Corporation (Rite-Aid) and KPMG. KPMG agreed
to pay $125 million to the shareholders as part of the Stipulation of
Settlement.144 KPMG allegedly failed to accurately police Rite-Aid’s 1999
restatement of earnings which contained fraudulent information.145 While
District Judge Dalzell stated that this was a “difficult case,” as it was very
possible that KPMG itself was a victim as well as the shareholders, the fact
that KPMG settled shows the stringent liabilities that auditors truly face.146
This is the exact type of fraud and oversight that the SEC, through
SOX, has been attempting to prevent.147 The immense legal liabilities that
auditors face exist because it is necessary to hold them liable in order to
increase investor confidence.148 To cap liability when mistakes like this are
still occurring is simply giving auditors a license to be less careful.
While paying these large settlements is a testament to the liabilities that
accounting firms face, nothing speaks more obviously to the threat these
liabilities pose than the collapse of Arthur Andersen. Arthur Andersen was
Enron’s accounting firm, and, at the time, was the fifth largest accounting

Berger & Grossman LLP and Barrack, Rodos & Bacine, BNET.COM, Dec. 17, 1999, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi)m0EIN/is_1999_Dec_17/ai58295570/?tag=content;coll.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Second Largest Accounting Firm Settlement Ever, 10B-5 DAILY, June 2, 2003,
http://www.the10b-5daily.com/archives/000132/html. KPMG, of the United States, together with
its Belgium counterpart, was also forced to settle for $115 million in a lawsuit brought against
them by the shareholders of Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products, N.V., a Belgium software
company. Investors Reach $115 Million Settlement with accounting Firms Klynveld Peat Marwick
Goerdeler Bedrijfsrevisoren and KPMG L.L.P., Berman Devalerio Pease Tabacco Burt & Pucillo
Oct.
7,
2004,
http://findarticles.com/p/articels/mi_m
Announces,
BNET.COM,
0EIN/is_2004. The corporation was charged with using “every accounting trick in the book” to
attempt to defraud their investors through accounting reports. Id. These procedures eventually
resulted in the company going bankrupt and the shareholders losing their investments in the
corporation. Id. The stock had been artificially inflated, which is what led to the bankruptcy, and
KPMG failed to either notice or report the fraudulent statements and reports, resulting in their
liability, and pushing them to settle. See id.
145. Second Largest Accounting Firm Settlement Ever, supra note 144.
146. See id. Other notable settlements in the United States are as follows: Deloitte settled with
Fortress Re. in 2005 for $250 million; PricewaterhouseCoopers settled with Tyco shareholders for
$225 million in July of 2007; Arthur Andersen settled with the Baptist Fund of Arizona for $217
million in 2002; and Deliotte settled with Adelphia for $210 million in November of 2006.
Telberg, supra note 139.
147. McCauley-Parles et al., supra note 132.
148. See id.
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firm in the world.149 Although their liability in the Enron scandal was
dismissed by the Supreme Court in 2005, the wake of the Enron scandal left
the firm unable to survive.150 Clients began to flee for fear that the firm was
unable to serve its role as gatekeeper, which, when coupled with the firm’s
legal liabilities, led to the firm’s demise.151
The implosion of Arthur Andersen in 2002 sparked the beginning of a
push towards restricting the liability that accounting firms face.152 Many
auditors argue that there is a definite risk that more firms could implode in
the near future in light of the liabilities that accounting firms face.153 Thus
far, auditors have been unable to gain outside insurance for these
liabilities.154 While they have attempted self-insurance through whollyowned insurance companies, it is not clear that these insurance attempts
will be sufficient to protect auditors.155
Auditors arguing for a cap on liability share the same concerns. The
fear is that the liability that auditors currently face could result in the
collapse of another major auditing firm.156 The auditor lobby argues that
while the role of private litigation is important in capital markets, there
should be “concern over rising litigation costs, ‘mega’ suits, and pressure
on audit firms to settle cases instead of litigating them.”157 Various actors
have “moved in numerous ways to place enhanced scrutiny on the financial
reporting and controls practices within publicly traded firms. Amid this
flurry of activity . . . [a]uditors now face enhanced vulnerability to liability
risks that––at least according to some––threaten the . . . viability of the
industry as we know it.”158 However, the increased liability auditors now
complain of is the precise liability we want them to face. “The tort system is
designed to create incentives for auditors to take appropriate actions to
minimize the issuance of misleading financial statements and to compensate
users for their recoverable losses” should the auditor fail to properly
perform its duties.159 Removing potential liability will not further the goal
of increasing investor confidence through valid and thorough information,

149. Economist.com, Research Tools Backgrounders: Arthur Andersen, July 7, 2005,
http://www.economist.com/background/displayBackground.cfm?story_id=4033756.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also Flynn McRoberts, A Final Accounting: The Fall of Andersen, CHICAGO TRIB.,
at 1, Sept. 1, 2002 (discussing the collapse of Arthur Andersen and the effect that the Enron
liability had on the corporation).
152. See Mark, supra note 88.
153. Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big Four Auditors, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
1641, 1643 (2006).
154. Id. at 1643.
155. Id. at 1642.
156. James H. Irving et al., supra note 27.
157. Id. at 2.
158. Talley, supra note 153, at 1642.
159. Irving, supra note 27, at 4.
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as the very mechanism designed to ensure accuracy will be largely
diminished.
While shareholders bringing federal securities class actions are
understandably a potential cause of the demise of one of the Big Four
auditors, there are other liabilities that auditors face in relation to their role
as gatekeepers. An auditor could potentially implode as a result of losing its
ability to practice following criminal sanctions.160 Money sanctions and
penalizations imposed in both civil and criminal litigation could also bring
about the potential collapse of an accounting firm.161 And finally, auditors
face the threat of federal securities class action lawsuits—the impetus
behind the efforts to cap liability.162
In light of these liabilities, the Big Four accounting firms have decided
to lobby for a cap on the potential liabilities they could face, and have also
attempted to use contractual clauses to shield themselves.163 The Big Four
are asking the firms they audit to limit their right to sue, and to waive their
right to punitive damages.164 While this will only cap corporations’ ability
to sue, it does have the potential to save the accounting firms the large sums
of money they are forced to pay to the corporations.165 Even though auditors
will still face liability to the shareholders that bring federal securities class
actions, the agreements attempt to bar derivative suits.166 Various
complaints have been made by investors who argue that these agreements
may violate SEC rules, and that the provisions overall are too self-interested
and against the SEC principal of putting the investor first.167 Auditors have
also attempted to further alter their liability, without government assistance,
through contract law, by including arbitration clauses, indemnity and holdharmless provisions, and other similar protections in their dealings with
clients.168
IV. PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING AUDITOR LIABILITY
While calls for limiting auditor liability are not novel, they are starting
to gain attention in the United States.169 At the same time they are growing

160.
161.
162.
163.

Talley, supra note 153, at 1648.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1642; Robert Schmidt, ‘No Suit’ Accounting Contracts Set Off Alarms, INT’L
HERALD TR., at 20, Dec. 13, 2005.
164. Schmidt, supra note 163.
165. Robert Schmidt, Ernst, KPMG Liability Caps Draw Fire from Regulators, Investors,
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 12, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000103&sid
=aVGCZaozSkAI.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Talley, supra note 153, at 1642.
169. See Penny Sukhraj, FRC Appeals to US Watchdog Over Auditor Liability Deals,
ACCOUNTANCY AGE, at 2, June 12, 2008, available at http://www.accountancyage.com/2218842.
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increasingly popular in the European Union (E.U.).170 The Financial
Reporting Council (FRC) claims that it is playing the leading role in
persuading the SEC to create a limitation to the liability that auditors face in
light of this trend taking hold in other parts of the global economy.171
The Big Four argue that any efforts in the United Kingdom (U.K.) to
cap liability must coincide with efforts to limit liability in the U.S. and
Europe alike, in order to deal with the many corporations that are listed in
more than one nation.172 In the U.K. auditors may limit liability
contractually, provided the shareholders approve it,173 but “cannot enter into
such arrangements . . . with clients who either dual-listed shares, or listed
debt in the [U.S.] since it would constitute a breach of [U.S.] auditorindependence rules.”174 Therefore, a failure to limit auditor liability in the
U.S. would essentially halt any attempts to limit auditor liability in the
U.K.175 Corporations listed solely in the U.K. are unlikely to accept capping
the liability of their auditors if the corporations that are bi-listed do not have
to.176 This would effectively reverse any advances that auditor liability
reforms in the U.K. have made to limit liability through shareholder
agreements.177
Several groups in the United States are faced with the daunting task of
developing compelling proposals to cap auditor liability in the United
States, despite the fact that the liability exists as a means of ensuring that
auditors properly perform their role. Arthur Levitt, the former SEC
Chairman, is currently leading a committee charged with the task of
digesting close to twenty different reports on the potential ways to solve the
supposed auditor liability problem in the United States.178 Although many
proposals have been offered, the U.S. Treasury is not taking the pro-cap
stance that the accounting lobby would have hoped for.179 Reforms limiting
the auditors’ liability in litigation have not even been addressed by the U.S.
Treasury or the SEC.180

170. See id.
171. Id.
172. Neil Hodge, Limiting Auditor Liability, WORLD FIN., Nov. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.worldfinance.com/magazinearticles/article388.html.
173. Sukhraj, supra note 169.
174. Id.
175. Penny Sukhraj, Will the US Say Yes?, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, July 3, 2008,
http://www.accountancyage.com/220589.
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing
Profession Adopts Final Report (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
hp1159.htm; The Corporate Counsel, http://www.thecorproatecounsel.net/blog/archive/ (Apr. 22,
2008, 06:10 EST) (edited by Broc Romanek & David Lynn).
179. Penny Sukhraj, US Auditors Call for Urgent Action on Liability Reform, ACCOUNTANCY
AGE, Sept. 4, 2008, http://www.accountancyage.com/2225313.
180. Id.
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Further supporting the push to limit the liability of auditors is the
Paulson Committee Report, also known as the Committee on Capital
Markets Regulation.181 The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation is
“an independent and nonpartisan 501(c)(3) research organization dedicated
to improving the regulation of U.S. capital markets.”182 The Paulson Report
speaks to the impairment that the corporate world would face if another
accounting firm collapses in the near future in light of growing auditor
liability.183 In particular, the report stated that “there are more than three
dozen cases involving tens of billions of dollars of potential exposure to
accounting firms, and expressed the concern that even a relatively small
share of proportional liability in these cases may lead to the financial failure
of one of the remaining firms.”184 The report suggested potential aspects of
the field which need to be reformed to protect the Big Four, including: (1)
creating a legislative safe harbor for particular auditing practices that are
used throughout the industry; (2) creating a legislative cap on the liability
that auditors face; (3) appointing monitors to oversee auditing firms who
have engaged in particular professional failures; (4) and restricting the
criminal liability that auditors currently face in the post-SOX era.185
There are several other committees in the U.S. that also promote a cap
on liability. Keeping in line with the ideas of the Paulson committee, the
Bloomberg-Schumer Report186 also recommends a cap on auditor liability
to maintain the auditing industry in the U.S. and prevent the failure of one
of the Big Four.187 The Commission on the Regulation of the U.S. Capital
Markets in the 21st Century has reported on the risks which auditors face.188
181. Posting of Josh Silverman to Pomtalk.com, http://www.pomtalk.com/pomtalk/2006/12/
paulson_committ.html (Dec. 5, 2006, 10:22 EST).
182. Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Home Page, http://www.capmktsreg.org/ (last
visited Apr. 21, 2010).
183. Jonathan C. Dickey, Auditor Liability “Caps” – The Politics of Catastrophe, SEC. LITIG.
REP., at 1, 5, Nov. 2008.
184. Jonathan C. Dickey, Litigation Against Accountants & Lawyers: The Year of Living
Dangerously 10 (17th Annual Litig. Resolution of Complex Class Actions Workshop, Paper,
2007), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Dickey-YearOfLiving
Dangerously.pdf.
185. Id.
186. See MAYOR MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & SENATOR CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING
NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL116000pub/materials/library/NY_SchumerBloomberg_REPORT_FINAL.pdf. The Bloomberg-Schumer report was created by New York
City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and New York Senator Charles Schumer. Id. It warns that “if we
do nothing, within ten years while we will remain a leading regional financial center; we will no
longer be the financial capital of the world.” Id. at i. It finds, among other things, that the U.S.
regulatory framework is a “thicket of complicated rules, rather than a streamlined set of
commonly understood principles.” Id. at ii. It calls for re-examination of SOX implementation,
legal reforms to reduce meritless litigation, and easing immigration restrictions. Id. at ii.
187. Id. at 102.
188. COMMISSION ON THE REGULATION OF U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS IN THE 21ST CENTURY,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS: AN EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 16 (2007).
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For their part, the SEC argues that we need to establish more realistic
expectations of the abilities of auditors, encouraging
domestic and international market participants and policy-makers to
engage immediately in a serious evaluation and discussion of possible
means to address this risk of catastrophic loss [of a large public audit
firm], including this Commission’s recommendation regarding backup
insurance sponsored by Group of Eight (G-8) governments or international
financial organizations, and various proposals . . . regarding safe harbors
or damage limits in specified circumstances.189

Because of the global nature of our markets,190 it is worth looking
further at the E.U.’s move towards limiting the liability of auditors. The
E.U. has come the furthest in developing plans to limit the liability of
auditors, with several member states adopting legislation to this end.191 The
E.U.’s proposals for limiting auditors’ liability mirror plans being
considered in the U.S.192
The E.U. has taken several steps towards developing a European wide
proposal to cap the liability that European auditors face.193 An E.U.
Commission has been researching the potential ways to cap the liability of
auditors, and published a paper in 2007 that analyzed proposed means of
capping liability as well as the potential liabilities auditors may be forced to
deal with in the future.194 The European push to cap auditor liability stems
from a litigious climate very similar to that in the United States.195
Europeans have similar concerns that one of the Big Four auditors there
could collapse and create potentially negative effects on the economy.196
The E.U. Commission has proposed four general plans to cap liability,
and recognizes that due to differences in economies and financial markets
in different nations, there is probably no “one-size-fits-all approach.”197
However, research and discussion of plans to cap auditor liability in the
E.U. are more advanced than those in the U.S. and, as such, are worth
discussing in more detail.198The four proposals are: (1) a fixed monetary
cap;199 (2) a cap based on the size of the company that was audited “as
189. Id. at 16–17.
190. SEC, supra note 22.
191. Talley, supra note 153, at 1642; Jeremy Woolfe, Auditor Liability Debate Accelerates in
EU, COMPLIANCE WK. (Jul. 10, 2007).
192. Woolfe, supra note 191.
193. See Zubli, supra note 130.
194. Commission Plans to Cap Auditors’ Liability, EURACTIV.COM, Jan. 19, 2007,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/financial-services/commission-plans-cap-auditors-liability/article161024?_print [hereinafter EURACTIV].
195. See generally id (discussing “ruinous claims” auditors face in Europe).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Whitehouse, supra note 18.
199. Marianne Ojo, Proposals for a New Audit Liability in Europe 4 (Mar. 23, 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1407212.
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measured by its market capitalization;”200 (3) a cap which is established by
calculating a multiple of the fees charged for the audit;201 and (4) the
principle of proportionate liability which holds each party (auditor and
corporation) liable only for the portion of the loss that corresponds directly
to their degree of responsibility and involvement.202
The fixed monetary cap on auditor liability is probably the most
troubling plan, and garners the least support among interested parties.203
The fixed monetary cap establishes a monetary amount that will serve as a
ceiling to all recoveries involving litigation against any accounting firm in
connection with their auditing function.204 The goal of the fixed monetary
cap is harmonization of E.U. policy, as all member states will have the
same legislative cap in effect.205 The problems surrounding the fixed
monetary cap largely revolve around the monetary value amount that will
be selected by the legislatures.206 If the cap is too low, then even the
maximum recovery may be unable to protect the largest, most highly
capitalized corporations.207 If the cap is set very high, this will only work to
protect the Big Four, as the smaller auditors that currently face liabilities as
well will not be protected or shielded from the liability they face.208
While the criticisms to the fixed monetary cap are many,209 several
European nations have enacted a legislative fixed monetary cap on auditor
liabilities.210 In December 2005, Belgium codified a law that created a fixed
monetary cap,211 and established a monetary cap of €3 million for the audit
of an unlisted company that is either required by statute or requested by a
particular law or regulation, and a cap of €12 million for listed
corporations.212 Coupled with this fixed monetary cap is a compulsory
insurance policy, which ensures that coverage is in line with the potential
liabilities that auditors can face in the new regime, guaranteeing that
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16, 21–22.
See Walter Doralt et. al., Auditors’ Liability and Its Impact on the European Financial
Markets, 67 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 62, 64 (2008) (discussing the operation of a fixed monetary cap
whereby a moentary value is set as a limit to the auditor’s liability).
205. Letter from Grant Thornton Int’l, London Office, to the European Commission, (Mar. 15,
2007), available at http://www.gti.org/files/covering%20letter%20ifrs%208%20questionnaire%
20gti%2015%20june%202007.pdf.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16, at 22.
210. Jeremy Woolfe, EU Calls for Input on Auditor Liability Caps, COMPLIANCE WK., Feb. 6,
2007, https://www.complianceweek.com/article/3084/eu-calls-for-input-on-auditor-liability-caps.
211. Directive General for Internal Market and Services, Commission Staff Working Papers:
Consultation on Auditors’ Liability and Its Impact on the European Capital Markets, at 1 (Feb.
2007), available at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/abschlus
sprfung/abschlussprfern/institute_registered/_EN_1.0_&a=d.
212. Id.
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auditors are sufficiently insured.213 The Directive General for Internal
Market and Services of Belgium supports having fixed monetary caps
throughout Europe, but agrees that this cannot be on an across the board
basis and favors setting the cap at different levels depending on the
particular member state.214 Austria, Germany, and Greece215 also have
auditor liability caps that serve as a flat ceiling on potential recovery from a
lawsuit.216
While fixed monetary caps have been put into effect in several nations,
they are still highly unpopular.217 The first major issue is that a flat
monetary cap will always be a one-sized fits all approach.218 Whether it is
the E.U. or the U.S., different jurisdictions have a “‘diversity of
circumstances in terms of both audits and company size . . . such that it is
unlikely that a one-size-fits-all . . . approach is the most [appropriate].’”219
Beyond the inadequacy of the implementation of the policy is the
underlying principle that the SECs purpose of making individuals
personally liable was to ensure high-quality accurate work to promote
investor confidence.220 “Limiting auditor liability would reduce auditor and
audit firm accountability, provide a significant market incentive to take
audit shortcuts, aggressive treatments, and reduce overall audit quality to
the detriment of investors.”221 This lack of accountability, and the resulting

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. European Commission, A Study on Systems of Civil Liability of Statutory Auditors in the
Context of a Single Market for Auditing Services in the European Union, at 3.1.3 (Apr. 2003),
available at ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/auditliability_en.pdf.
216. Conrad Hewitt, Chief Accountant, SEC, Remarks at the Practising Law Institute’s SEC
Speaks Series, (Feb. 9, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch
020907cwh.htm.
217. EURACTIV, supra note 194; Directorate General for Internal Market and Services,
Commission Staff Working Paper: Consultation on Auditor’s Liability and its Impact on the
European Capital Markets, at 12 (Jan. 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/auditing/docs/liability/consultation-paper_en.pdf [hereinafter Directorate General,
Commission Staff Working Paper] (explaining that, while European nations have adopted a flat
cap on auditor liability, there are various problems which make it an unlikely solution to the
auditor liability problem).
218. Letter from Liz Murrall, Senior Advisor – Corporate Governance, Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n, to
European Commission (Mar. 23, 2007), available at http://www.investmentuk.org/news/
research/2004/topic/corporate_governance/062-07-01.pdf (regarding “EU consultation on
[a]uditors’ [l]iability and its [i]mpact on the European [c]apital [m]arkets”).
219. Id. at 3 (quoting EC-DG Internal Mkt. &Svcs., Final Report: Study on the Economic
Impact of Auditor’s Liability Regimes, at xxiii, MARKT/2005/24/F (Sept. 2006) (prepared by
London Economics in association with Professor Ralph Ewert), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/auditing/docs/liability/auditors-final-report_en.pdf.
220. See generally Dornbrook, supra note 28.
221. Interview by U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Advisory Comm. on the Auditing Profession with
Dennis Johnson, Senior Portfolio Manager, Corporate Governance, California Pub. Employee’s
Ret. Sys. (Apr. 30, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/acap/
agendas/QFRs-2-4-08.pdf.
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decrease in investor confidence, is the precise reason why the cap on
auditor liability is not the proper solution.222
Providing auditors with a fixed monetary cap as a ceiling to liability
will most certainly decrease the incentive to provide accurate and thorough
reports to investors on the financial health of a corporation. This proposal
goes directly against the SECs goal of increasing transparency and will
likely decrease investor confidence once they learn that auditors’ liabilities
are capped.223 Furthermore, the fact that there is a precise dollar amount for
the cap could lead auditors to do a cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether it is cost-effective to expend the labor and time necessary to
perform the most accurate audit reports. In our current economic climate,
we need continued investment from investors. Establishing a policy that
will threaten the prospect of increased investment by reducing investor
confidence is not befitting of our financial crisis.
The next proposal is a cap based on the size of the corporation being
audited.224 The goals of this system are similar to that achieved by a fixed
cap, but this method ensures proper compensation “since it considers the
possible relevance of the audited company’s size with reference to the
amount of damages that can be assessed.”225 This system will theoretically
prevent the catastrophic loss that auditors could potentially face should they
make a mistake that leads the audited corporation or its shareholders to
sue.226
Caps based on the size of the corporation are not without their problems
either.227 Criticisms largely stem from utilizing market capitalization as the
proxy for determining liability.228 Different nations calculate market
capitalization in a variety of ways, and there would be difficulties when
dealing with listed as opposed to unlisted corporations.229 Furthermore,
market capitalization is a highly volatile figure that can alter drastically
from the time the audit is performed to when the potential lawsuit begins.230
Regardless, a cap based on the size of the corporation is still an overall
ceiling to the liability that auditors will face, and brings with it the same
problems of decreased quality and accuracy that any other flat cap does.231

222. Irving et al., supra note 27, at 8.
223. See generally SEC, supra note 22 (as the goal of the SEC in creating statutory audits was
to prevent fraud and misstatements and increase investor confidence by holding auditors liable,
decreasing this liability is in direct opposition to the purported goals of the SEC).
224. See EURACTIV, supra note 194.
225. Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16, at 22.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 23.
228. See id.
229. See EURACTIV, supra note 194.
230. See Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16.
231. Murrall, supra note 218.
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Auditors will be less careful if they know that they do not face unlimited
liabilities. This plan may even be worse than a fixed monetary cap because
auditors’ potential liability to small corporations that are not highly
capitalized will be relatively minimal. This means that auditors will have a
disincentive to do thorough work in smaller corporations, regardless of
whether or not they are listed, gravely affecting the capital markets as
potential investors will be aware of these decreased incentives. This will not
only deter investment in smaller corporations, but will also diminish
confidence in the stock market in general as the major incentive for auditors
to do thorough work would be limited.
The third proposal is a cap that is calculated by taking a multiple of the
audit fees the auditor charged for the services in question.232 This plan is
purported to be a neutral basis from which to formulate a cap.233 This plan
also avoids the potential disparate risks that would exist between listed and
unlisted companies.234 A cap based on a multiple of the audit fee is a system
of liability capping that is seen by many to be a reasonable proxy for
proportionate liability because the audit fee is negotiated by reference to the
size, complexity, and risk of the audit assessment.235
There are arguments against utilizing a multiple of the audit fees
charged because this plan risks creating a fee dropping scenario whereby
auditors will continuously decrease the cost of their auditing services and
try to make up for the loss in non-audit services.236 This decrease in costs
could also mean that the potential will exist for decreased quality, thereby
rendering audit reports inadequate to promote investor confidence in the
capital markets.237 Furthermore, when large corporations pay for audit
services, they normally pay a large amount for the entire corporation that is
often arbitrarily allocated to different individual group members, and
therefore, may not be entirely proportional to the work that has been done
or the liability that should exist.238
While multiplying the auditor’s fees may arguably be more reasonable
than a flat cap on liability, it is merely the lesser of two evils. Capping
liability, regardless of the dollar amount that is used, still reduces the
incentive to perform quality audits. Furthermore, since auditors are the ones
calling for this cap, it is extremely likely that the industry as a whole will
set artificially low prices to cap liability as low as possible. Auditors will
focus on the non-audit aspects of their business, and the role of the external
auditor, as the SEC has created it, could largely disappear. Liability will be
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

EURACTIV, supra note 194.
Ojo, supra note 199, at 6.
Id.; see also Zubli, supra note 130, at 2.
Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16, at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23–24.
Id.
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so minimal that fear of litigation will no longer serve as an impetus to
honestly report to potential investors.
The final plan calls for proportionate liability.239 The basic premise of
proportionate liability is that the auditor is only liable for the portion of
damage that corresponds to their degree of responsibility.240 Proportionate
liability has recently gained scholarly attention, as it has been included in a
plan adopted by the U.K.241 Amendments have been made to the Companies
Act in order to permit auditor liability limitation agreements.242 The
Companies Act requires approval of auditor liability limitation agreements
by the shareholders and the agreement must be fair and reasonable in order
to be upheld.243 This is the key component to the legislation because it gives
courts the ability to override any element of the agreement that is neither
fair nor reasonable, and set a new level of liability, regardless of who has
approved the contract.244 While the determination of what is fair and
reasonable is left to the courts, the Companies Act states abstract principles
to guide courts in rendering their decision.245 In fact, the guiding principles
are so abstract that they offer little to no actual guidance to the courts
anyway.246
Proportionate liability is often favored by a majority of constituencies
that support capping the liability of auditors.247 Yet, it is still defective.
There are difficulties surrounding how the court will determine what the
exact degree of responsibility was for particular individuals or groups.248
Furthermore, terms such as “fair and reasonable” or “proportionate to their
responsibility,” which serve as the backbone of the limitation agreements,

239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 24–25.
Directorate General, Commission Staff Working Paper, supra note 217, at 13.
The Corporate Counsel, supra note 178.
Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16.

A liability limitation agreement is defined in the Act as an agreement that purports to
limit the amount of a liability owed to a company by its auditor in respect of any
negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust occurring in the course of the audit
of accounts, for which the auditor may be responsible in relation to the company.
FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNSEL, GUIDANCE ON AUDITOR LIABILITY LIMITATION
AGREEMENTS, 2008, § 2.2.
243. The Corporate Counsel, supra note 178.
244. Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16, at 25.
245. FINANCIAL REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 242, §§ 2.4, 2.5. These abstract principles
include: the auditor’s liability under the Act; the nature and purpose of the obligation the auditor
has to the corporation; and the professional standards of auditors. Id.
246. See id. § 2.5.
247. Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16, at 24; see also FINANCIAL
REPORTING COUNCIL, supra note 242, § 2.13 (discussing the overall uncertainty that surrounds
the interpretation of these clauses).
248. Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16, at 24–25.
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are not definitive legal standards.249 Even in the U.K., where proportionate
liability has been adopted, regulators have made it clear that they will not
define the parameters of the fair and reasonable standard.250 Rather, this
determination will be made on a case-by-case basis, allowing the courts to
substitute their own terms where they find that the contractual limit was
insufficient.251 Establishing proportionate liability through contractual
clauses may not be feasible for all nations, especially those where auditors
can be held liable in tort law.252 Furthermore, depending on how high the
degree of responsibility is, the liability the auditors face may still be
incredibly high, failing to address the largest grievance of proponents of
any plan to cap the liability of auditors.253
Theoretically, proportionate liability appears to be the most promising
means of capping auditor liability, as auditors will only be held liable for
their own misconduct. However, determining the liability of each party
involved in corporate misconduct that could potentially have occurred over
long periods of time, in various parts of the corporation, will be difficult, if
not impossible. Allowing courts to determine what is fair and reasonable in
an agreement to cap the liability of auditors permits judges to act as
legislators in determining when and how the liability of auditors should be
capped. This means that different courts throughout the country will
establish varying standards for what is fair and reasonable. If auditors’
liabilities are going to be capped, then it should be a result of a uniform
decision by the legislature to provide a national solution.
While there are many proponents for capping auditor liability,254
[a]rtificially limiting auditor liability [will] diminish incentives to push
back on overreaching management, reduce auditor accountability and
reduce audit quality. This would, in turn, harm our capital markets,
because it would undermine the most precious and fragile commodity we
have—investor confidence in the accuracy and transparency of financial
statements. To sum up the merits of a cap on auditor liability in two
words: Not smart.255

249. Frances Brown et al., United Kingdom: Limiting Auditors’ Liability: The Sky is No Longer
the Limit, MONDAQ.COM, Apr. 16, 2008, available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
articleid=59340.
250. See id.
251. Id.
252. Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16, at 25. Countries where auditors have
dual liability in tort law would have issues because they may not wish to establish proportionate
liability in torts, and defendants would have to be held to two different standards, which would
largely defeat the goal of capping the liability of auditors in the first place. Id.
253. Id. at 24–25. The EU supports an exception for intentional misconduct, but this does not go
far enough to remedy the aforementioned issues, as it is the effect of the flawed audit statement
not the nature of the breach that is at issue. Commission Recommendation (EC) No. C (2008)
2274 of 5 June 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 162) 39.
254. Directorate General, Summary Report, supra note 16, at 24.
255. Coffey, supra note 10, at 2.
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Because individual investors are vital to our capital markets, we must
be sensitive to their needs and consider what policies are best suited to
protect their interests and confidence in the market.256
CONCLUSION
In considering the potential effects of capping the liability of auditors it
is necessary to keep in mind what the role and the purpose of the external
auditor is in our international capital markets.257 The significance of the
audit is due to the fact that it provides
an important part of the capital market framework[,] as it not only reduces
the cost of information exchange between mangers and shareholders but
also provides a signalling mechanism to the markets that the information
which management is providing is reliable. The auditor provides
independent verification o[f] the financial statements of a company and as a
result, the audit loses its value when such independence which gives
credibility to the financial statements, is undermined.258

Statutory auditors are an integral aspect of establishing investor
confidence in our capital markets.259 In light of the current domestic
financial crisis, and the effects that the U.S. capital markets have on the
global capital markets as a whole,260 investor confidence is incredibly
important to promote investment in the U.S. capital markets.261 In a
recession, investor confidence is arguably one of the most important
aspects to promote increased investment, thereby increasing demand and
decreasing layoffs.262 The success of a capitalist system is based on
growth and investment. Establishing sufficient investor confidence
ensures this.263
Auditors argue that they face potentially devastating liabilities.
However, if their work is properly performed, these liabilities cease to exist.
Decreasing liability decreases the incentive to do thorough and accurate
work, as the potential costs of a mistake are lessened when liability is
decreased. Auditor liability was created by the SEC to increase accuracy
and investor confidence. Decreasing auditor liability will go great lengths in
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Stout, supra note 3, at 36.
SEC, supra note 22.
Ojo, supra note 9, at 2 (emphasis in original).
Irving et al., supra note 27, at 8.
See Posting of Bob McTeer to Economix, available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/11/19/which-part-of-the-economy-will-carry-us-through-this-recession/ (Nov. 19, 2008,
09:21 EST).
261. Mark W. Olson, Chairman, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., Speech at FEE
Conference on Audit Regulation: Auditor Oversight and Its Implications on the Resilience of Our
Capital Markets (Oct. 12, 2006), available at http://pcaobus.org/News/Speech/Pages/10122006
_OlsonFEEConferenceAuditRegulation.aspx.
262. DAVID SCHWEICKART, AGAINST CAPITALISM 162 (1996).
263. See id.
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shattering the confidence of investors. “Investor [confidence] provides the
foundation on which the American securities market has been built.
Without such trust, our market would be a thin shadow of its present
self.”264 It is evident that to cap liability at a time when investor confidence
is needed most is both inappropriate and irresponsible financial legislation,
and the U.S. capital markets cannot afford the loss of investment that will
accompany a cap in this financial crisis.
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